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Abstract
We present a basic exogenous growth model with two consumption goods that
differ as regards their contributions to environmental pollution. Allowing for habit
formation of the polluting good, we show under which conditions habit formation
raises the consumption of the clean good relative to the dirty one in the compet-
itive economy. Further, we demonstrate when habit formation generates a lower
steady-state pollution stock compared to the situation without habits. Finally, we
determine the Pigou tax rates and we illustrate that the social optimum may imply
a higher steady-state pollution than the competitive economy if the habit formation
is sufficiently strong.
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1 Introduction
An important aspect in solving the problem of environmental pollution, such as global
warming for example, plays technical progress. A great step towards a cleaner environemt
will be achieved once it succeeds to replace polluting methods of production by non-
polluting ones. In analyzing that topic, economists often consider energy production and
study the question of how a less polluting production process can be implemented without
leading to output and welfare losses.
Thus, switching from dirty to clean energy is the subject of a great many studies.
For example, Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) present a resource model where the use of the
resource generates negative externalities. There exists a non-polluting perfect substitute
for the polluting resource, with the non-polluting backstop being available at a constant
unit cost. Hoel and Kverndokk show, among other things, that it is optimal to extract the
polluting resource even when its price is equal to the price of the non-polluting resource. In
a more recent contribution, van der Ploeg and Withagen (2014) adopt the model by Hoel
and Kverndokk and change two assumptions: They do not allow for a decay of greenhouse
gases and they assume that capital must be built up to produce the final output. However,
capital is not a perfect substitute for the energy input but, rather, there is a backstop
that can perfectly substitute the non-renewable energy source. Energy is produced using
a polluting non-renewable resource and a non-polluting renewable energy source that is
available at a constant unit cost, as in Hoel and Kverndokk. They show that it is optimal
to use only the polluting resource initially and, later on, only renewables, when the initial
stock of the polluting resource is small. The lower the cost of the renewable, the more of
the polluting energy source is left in situ and the sooner the only renewable phase starts.
The models by Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) and by van der Ploeg and Withagen (2014)
have the same structure: There is a polluting resource that can be perfectly substituted
by a non-polluting one at a given cost, with both variables being control variables. Hence,
their models belong to the general class of models analyzed by Krautkraemer (1998).
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Greiner et al. (2014) present a more elaborate framework with regard to the backstop
technology. There, it is assumed that a capital stock must be built up first in order to
produce the renewable energy. The model considers the decentralized market economy
and derives optimal taxes and subsidies such that the market economy replicates the social
optimum. It turns out that it can be optimal to not completely exploit the non-renewable
resource that is used to generate energy, but, rather to leave a certain part in situ. The
outcome depends on the efficiency of the backstop technology, i.e. of the renewable energy
source, and on the initial stock of the non-renewable resource.
All of those contributions have in common that they adopt a supply side view. Indeed,
there exist only very few studies that analyze the role of preference with respect to the
choice between a clean and a dirty consumption good. One exception is the contribution
by Scalera (1996) who assumes that the stock of pollution depends on aggregate produc-
tion and on the amount of the dirty consumption good, whereas clean consumption does
not pollute the environment. The paper derives the Pigouvian taxes that make the decen-
tralized competitive economy replicate the social optimum. Further, the paper shows that
the trade-off between economic activity and the environment is mitigated by the presence
of the non-polluting consumption good. Another paper with clean and dirty consump-
tion is the one by Orecchia and Tessitore (2011). Those authors analyze an endogenous
growth model where they allow for a clean and dirty consumption good and demonstrate
that the substitution of the dirty consumption good by the clean consumption good is
not sufficient to reduce the pollution of the environment. Further, they show that an
environmental Kuznets curve may arise in their framework.
One aspect that is not considered in those papers dealing with clean and dirty con-
sumption is the role of habits that can arise by consuming dirty consumption goods over
a longer period of time.1 A contribution in the economics literature, where the effects of
habits in a growth model with environmental pollution have been studied, is the paper
1For a survey of habits in economics, see for example Hodgson (2004).
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by Ikefuji (2008). He demonstrates that ongoing growth in his model with habits is only
possible if there is sufficiently rapid technical change that stimulates the incentive to in-
vest. But that contribution only considers a hoogeneous consmption good and does not
differentiate between clean and dirty consumption.
In this paper, our goal is to study the optimal allocation between clean and dirty
consumption allowing for habits that arise from the consumption of the dirty good. We
assume that the dirty consumption good has been consumed over a certain time period in
the past, when a clean consumption good becomes available. The consumer, then, solves
a new intertemporal optimization problem where he can choose between the clean and
the dirty good. We analyze both the competitive economy and the social optimum.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model
with a clean and a dirty consumption good, where the dirty consumption good may build
up a stock of habits. Section 3 first analyzes the competitive economy in which the planer
does not take into account the externalities in solving the optimization problem and 4,
then, studies the social optimum. Section 5, finally, concludes the paper.
2 The model with clean and dirty consumption
We consider an economy with a clean and a dirty consumption good, where the consump-
tion of the dirty good may build up a stock of habits. Habits in our model are to be
seen as routines that are formed as a by-product of human behaviour. In our model,
they result from consuming the dirty consumption good in the past. Habits positively
affect the utility of the individual since they represent routines that make the individual
act without having to devote mental resources to achieve a certain goal. Thereby, habits
simplify everday life because new situations are dealt with automatically that, otherwise,
would require awareness and attention. The latter go along with efforts, in economic
terms costs, that can thus be avoided. In this respect, psychologists speak of automative
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thinking that is based on schemes, i.e. cognitive structures, which are the result of unin-
tended learning processes (see Aronson et al., 2004). Therefore, the habits are beneficial
for individuals and raise their utility. In this context, we should also like to point to the
so-called perseverance effect that makes individuals stick to certain routines even if they
have proven to be wrong that reinforces the effects of habits.
The household sector is represented by a continuum of infinitely lived homogenous
households with household production. Each individual household has measure zero and
the household sector has mass one. The utility function U of the representative household
is assumed to be given by2
U(·) =
(Cd(1 +H)
χ)1−σ − 1
1− σ
+
C1−σc − 1
1− σ
−D(P ), (1)
with Cd (Cc) dirty (clean) consumption, H the stock of habits and 1/σ > 0 the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution of consumption. The parameter χ = {0, 1} determines
whether habit formation occurs (for χ = 1) or whether habits do not arise (for χ = 0).
It should be noted that the term (1 + H) guarantees that habits exert a positive effect
on the utility going along with the consumption of the dirty good even for H < 1 (in
the case of χ = 1). Further, the function specified in equation (1) implies that clean and
dirty consumption are perfect substitutes. Environmental pollution is denoted by P and
D(P ) denotes the damages resulting from the stock of pollution that reduce utility of the
household.
It must also be pointed out that in the case of habit formation (χ = 1), preferences are
no longer intertemporally independent. In our model, the constant intertemporal elasticity
of substitution 1/σ determines whether the utility function displays distant or adjacent
complementarity. The condition 1/σ < 1 is sufficient for distant complementarity and
the condition 1/σ > 1 is necessary for adjacent complementarity. Even if neither of those
conditions is necessary and sufficient at the same time we speak of distant (adjacent) if
2We neglect the time argument t as long as no ambiguity arises.
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1/σ < (>)1 holds. From an economic point of view, distant (adjacent) complementarity
or, more concretely complementarity between distant (adjacent) dates, means that a
small increase of consumption at t3 shifts consumption from t2 to t1 (from t1 to t2), with
t1 < t2 < t3.
3 Loosely speaking, distant complementarity means that the household
prefers to have consumption smoothed over time, while adjacent complementarity implies
that the consumer prefers to have bundles of the consumption good at nearby dates.
Habits in our model may arise as a side effect of cumulated past consumption of the
dirty consumption good. Following the seminal paper by Ryder and Heal (1973), habit
formation is described by the following equation
H(t) = γ
∫ t
−∞
eγ(s−t)Cd(s)ds, for χ = 1. (2)
The parameter γ > 0 gives the weight attributed to more recent levels of dirty consump-
tion in the process of habit formation. The higher γ is, the larger is the weight given to
more recent levels of dirty consumption compared to consumption flows further back in
time. Differentiating equation (2) with respect to time leads to
H˙ = γ(Cd −H), H(0) = H0. (3)
As mentioned above, environmental pollution negatively affects the utility of the house-
hold, with D(·) giving the damages. The function D(·) is specified as
D(P ) = P 2/2. (4)
The environmental pollution is modelled as a stock and evolves according to
P˙ = ω1Cd + ω2Cc − ξP, P (0) = P0. (5)
The constant parameters ω1 > ω2 ≥ 0 give the contribution of one unit of the dirty and of
the clean consumption good to environmental pollution, respectively, and ξ > 0 reflects
the ability of the environment to recover.
3See Ryder and Heal (1973) or Greiner (1998), p. 72-74, for a more detailed discussion.
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Production in our economy takes place with physical capital, K, as the input factor.
The evolution of the capital stock can be written as
K˙ = AKβ − pdCd − pcCc − δK, K(0) = K0. (6)
The term Y = AKβ gives output as a function of the capital stock. Output can be used
for investment and for the consumption of the clean and of the dirty good, where pd and
pc denote the constant price of the dirty consumption good and of the clean consumption
good in terms of output, the price of which is set equal to one. The parameter δ is
the depreciation rate, A is a constant technology parameter and β gives the elasticity of
output with respect to capital.
3 The competitive economy
With competitive economy, we refer to the situation where the household maximizes the
discounted stream of utility subject to the resoutce constraint (6), but neglects the two
externalities (3) and (5). The justification for that is that there are a great many house-
holds so that the pollution of each individual household is small so that the representative
household does not take it into account in formulating its optimization problem. In equi-
librium, however, where all households behave identically, the aggregate stock of pollution
is built up as a by-product of consuming the polluting consumption good and affects util-
ity of each household. As concerns habit formation, this process happens unconsciously
so that the household is not explicitly aware of it and, therefore, does not take account
of it in setting up its optimization problem.
We assume that the representative household has consumed only polluting goods in the
past up to t = 0 that has built up a stock of habit. At t = 0, a non-pollluting consumption
good becomes available and the household has to choose between the polluting and the
non-polluting good. Denoting the rate of time preference by ρ, the optimization problem
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of the representative household can, then, be written as
max
Cd,Cc
∫
∞
0
e−ρt
(
(Cd(1 +H)
χ)1−σ − 1
1− σ
+
C1−σc − 1
1− σ
− P 2/2
)
dt, (7)
subject to (6). To solve the optimization problem, we set up the current-value Hamiltonian
as
Hs = U(·) + λ1
(
AKβ − pdCd − pcCc − δK
)
, (8)
with the utility function U(·) given by (1) and λ1 the shadow price or co-state variable of
physical capital. The necessary optimality conditions for an optimum are given by
∂H
∂Cd
= 0↔ Cd =
(
(1 +H)χ
λ1pd
)1/σ
(1 +H)−χ (9)
∂H
∂Cc
= 0↔ Cc = (λ1pc)
−1/σ (10)
λ˙1 = (ρ+ δ)λ1 − λ1βAK
β−1 (11)
In addition, we require that the usual transversality condition limt→∞ e
−ρtλ1K = 0 must
hold.
In equilibrium, environmental pollution (5) and habit formation (3) occur and influence
the evolution of the economy. Thus, the economy is completely described by the following
four-dimensional system of differential equations, in case of habit formation (χ = 1), and
by the three-dimensional system if habits do not occur (χ = 0),
λ˙1 = (ρ+ δ)λ1 − λ1βK
β−1 (12)
K˙ = AKβ − pd
(
(1 +H)χ(1−σ)
λ1pd
)1/σ
− pc (λ1pc)
−1/σ − δK, K(0) = K0 (13)
P˙ = ω1
(
(1 +H)χ(1−σ)
λ1pd
)1/σ
+ ω2 (λ1pc)
−1/σ − ξP, P (0) = P0 (14)
H˙ = χγ
((
(1 +H)χ
λ1pd
)1/σ
(1 +H)−χ −H
)
, H(0) = H0 (15)
Before we analyze the asymptotic behaviour of this system, we study the effect of habit
formation on clean and dirty consumption by looking at the consumption of clean goods
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relative to dirty goods, defined as Crel = Cc/Cd. The share of the clean consumption
good relative to the dirty one is given by
Crel :=
(
pd
pc
)1/σ
(1 +H)χ(σ−1)/σ (16)
From equation (16) we can derive our first result regarding the effect of habit formation
in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the competitive economy, the presence of habits raises (reduces) the
consumption of the clean good relative to the dirty good if the preferences of the consumer
are characterized by distant (adjacent) complementarity.
Proof: Follows immediately from (16) with 1/σ < (>) 1 characterizing distant (adjacent)
complementarity. 2
Proposition 1 shows that the ratio of the clean consumption good relative to the dirty
one will be higher in the situation when habit formation occurs, compared to the situa-
tion without habit formation, when there is distant complementarity. The reason for that
outcome is that in the case of distant complementarity the marginal product of the dirty
consumption good is smaller when habits are present compared to the situation without
habit formation. This holds because with distant complementarity the consumer tends
to smooth consumption over time. A lower marginal product of consumption reduces the
ratio of dirty to clean consumption or, equivalently, raises clean relative to dirty consump-
tion. In case of adjacent complementarity, the reverse holds. Then, habit formation raises
the marginal product of the dirty consumption good so that the ratio of clean consump-
tion relative to the dirty one becomes smaller. Finally, we should also like to point out
that in the situation without habit formation, the ratio of clean to dirty consumption is
completely determined by the price ratio of these two goods.
Before we study the transitional dynamics, we analyze the effect of habit formation
on the steady-state stock of pollution. Proposition 2 gives the result.
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Proposition 2 For ω1 > ω2(pd/pc), habits reduce (raise) the steady-state pollution if
the preferences are characterized by distant (adjacent) complementarity. In the case of
ω1 < ω2(pd/pc) habits raise (reduce) the steady-state pollution if the preferences are char-
acterized by distant (adjacent) complementarity.
Proof: See appendix A. 2
In order to understand and interpret proposition 2, we note that habits raise the
optimal value of the clean consumption good relative to the dirty one in the case of distant
compementarity (see proposition 1). Since total aggregate output at the steady-state is
given and independent of the presence of habits, more clean consumption implies less dirty
consumption. This tends to reduce pollution. However, the overall effect depends on by
how much clean and dirty consumption are increased and reduced, respectively, and on
the contribution to pollution of one unit of the dirty consumption good and of one unit
of the clean consumption good, i.e. on ω1 and on ω2. From the budget constraint of the
household at the steady-state, we know that the relative price pc/pd determines by how
much the dirty good declines when the clean good rises by one unit. If that ratio is larger
than one or, equivalently, if pd/pc is smaller than one, a rise of the clean consumption
good always reduces pollution because of ω1 > ω2. If, however, pc/pd is small so that
an increase of the clean consumption good by one unit only leads to a small decline of
dirty consumption, the latter may not be large enough so that pollution at the steady-
state rises, due to the higher consumption of the clean good that also contributes to
pollution, although to a smaller degree. This is particularly relevant when the difference
between ω1 and ω2 is only small, i.e. when the clean consumption good is only slightly
less polluting than the dirty good. Note that in the extreme case of ω2 = 0, i.e. when the
clean consumption good is not polluting at all, the presence of habits will always reduce
steady-state pollution in the case of distant complementarity. The same holds when the
clean consumption good is more expensive that the dirty good, which is expected to be
the more relevant case in real-world economies.
9
In the case of adjacent complementarity, the argumentation is just reverse to the
one in the situation with distant complementarity. With adjacent complementarity, the
presence of habits reduces the ratio of clean consumption relative to dirty consumption
at the steady-state. This effect will raise steady-state pollution, unless the increase of the
dirty consumption is very small, as clean consumption declines, due to a very high price
of the clean consumption good relative to the dirty good.
Before, we analyze the social optimum, we will study the question of uniqueness and
stability of the steady-state. Proposition 3 gives the result for the competitive economy
without habit formation.
Proposition 3 In the competitive economy without habit formation, there exists a unique
saddle point stable steady-state.
Proof: See appendix B. 2
Proposition 3 shows that our model is characterized by the usual long-run behaviour of
this type of growth models, even in the presence of an environmental externality. Hence,
there exists a unique value of the initial shadow price, λ1(0), giving unique values of
initial clean and dirty consumption such that the economy converges to the long-run
steady-state.
When we allow for habit formation the economy is described by a four-dimensional
differential equation system. In this case, the economy is also expected to be characterized
by a unique steady-state for plausible values of the intertemporal elasricity of substitution.
Proposition 4 shows the result.
Proposition 4 In the competitive economy with habit formation, a sufficient condition
for the existence of a unique steady-state is 1/σ ≤ 2 and distant complementarity of the
preferences, i.e. 1/σ < 1, is sufficient for saddle point stability of the steady-state.
Proof: See appendix C. 2
Proposition 4 demonstrates that the model is not necessarily characterized by a unique
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saddle point stable steady-state when habits are allowed for. However, it must be pointed
out that the conditions in the proposition are sufficient but not necessary for uniqueness
and saddle point stability so that we can expect a unique saddle point stable steady-state
even if they are not fulfilled. As regards the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, most
of the empirical studies that estimate it find small values. However, there are substantial
cross-country differences of this parameter and rich countries and economies with a high
stock market participation substitute a larger fraction of consumption intertemporally in
response to changes in expected asset returns. Havranek et al. (2015) perform a meta-
analysis and find a mean of 1/2 for the inter-temporal elasticity, but they also point out
that the estimates vary greatly between economies. In particular, there are also countries
for which the point estimate clearly exceeds 1 so that high values for that parameter
cannot be considered as purely academic.
In order to illustrate our results derived up to now, we resort to a numerical example,
where we use the following parameter values. We set the capital share to 30 percent,
β = 0.3, and the technology parameter is set equal to one, A = 1. The prices of both
consumer goods are set equal to one, pc = pd = 1, and one unit of the dirty consumption
good raises the stock of pollution by 0.1, ω1 = 0.1, and is ten times as high as the
contribution of one unit of the clean good, ω2 = 0.01. The depreciation rate of physical
capital is 7.5 percent, δ = 0.075, and pollution recovers at a rate of ξ = 0.1. The
parameter γ is set to 10 percent, γ = 0.1, implying that the contribution of one unit of
the dirty consumption good to current habits is e−0.1·1 = 0.905 and the contribution of
dirty consumption five years back is e−0.1·5 = 0.606. Finally, the discount rate is set to 3.5
percent, ρ = 0.035, and 1/σ takes the value 1/2 or 4/3. Table 1 shows the steady-state
values of the model without and with habit formation.4
4The ⋆ denotes steady-state values.
11
No habits (χ = 0) With habits (χ = 1)
C⋆c /C
⋆
p P
⋆ C⋆c /C
⋆
p P
⋆ H⋆
1/σ = 1/2 1 0.673 1.243 0.613 0.545
1/σ = 4/3 1 0.673 0.844 0.719 0.663
Table 1: Steady-state values of the competitive economy (K⋆ = 4.192).
Table 1 demonstrates that the model with habits leads to a higher steady-state ratio
of clean relative to dirty consumption in the case of distant complementarity (1/σ < 1)
and to a lower value of that ratio for adjacent complementarity (1/σ > 1). Further,
with distant complementarity the stock of pollution at the steady-state is lower compared
to the model without habit formation because with both prices set equal to one, i.e.
pc = pd = 1, the condition ω1 > ω2(pd/pc) in proposition 2 always holds. With adajcent
complementarity of the preferences, the presence of habits raises the steady-state stock of
pollution. Finally, we should like to point out that for the parameter values underlying
the outcome in table 1, both model versions are saddle point stable with two and three
negative real eigenvalues, respectively.
In the next section we present the social optimum and compare it to the competitive
economy.
4 The social optimum
For the social optimum, the maximization problem is written as
max
Cd,Cc
∫
∞
0
e−ρt
(
(Cd(1 +H)
χ)1−σ − 1
1− σ
+
C1−σc − 1
1− σ
− P 2/2
)
dt, (17)
subject to (3), (5), (6). The difference to the competitive economy is that now both
the pollution externality and the externality of consuming the dirty good, i.e. the habit
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formation, are taken into account in setting up the intertemporal optimization problem.
To solve the optimization problem, we set up the current-value Hamiltonian. The latter
is written as
Hs = U(·) + λs1
(
Kβ − pdCd − pcCc − δK
)
+
λs2 (ω1Cd + ω2Cc − ξP ) + λ
s
3χγ(Cd −H), (18)
with the utility function U(·) given by (1) and λsi , i = 1, 2, 3, the shadow prices or co-state
variables of capital, pollution and of habits, respectively.
The necessary optimality conditions for an optimum are as follows
∂H
∂Cd
= 0↔ Cd =
(
(1 +H)χ
λ1pd − λ3γ − λ2ω1
)1/σ
(1 +H)−χ (19)
∂H
∂Cc
= 0↔ Cc = (λ1pc − λ2ω2)
−1/σ (20)
λ˙s1 = (ρ+ δ)λ
s
1 − λ
s
1βAK
β−1 (21)
λ˙s2 = (ρ+ ξ)λ
s
2 + P (22)
λ˙s3 = χ
(
(ρ+ γ)λs3 − C
1−σ
d (1 +H)
−σ) (23)
In addition, we require that the usual transversality condition must hold that can be
written as, limt→∞ e
−ρt (λs1K + λ
s
2P + λ
s
3H) = 0. Thus, in the case of habit formation,
i.e. for χ = 1, the economy is completely described by the differential equations (3), (5),
(6), (21), (22), (23), with Cc and Cd determined by (19)-(20) respectively, and where
λsi (0), i = 1, 2, 3, are free.
5 When habit formation does not occur, i.e. for χ = 0, the econ-
omy is described by the differential equations (5), (6), (21), (22) and the corresponding
transversality condition.
Since the competitive economy and the social optimum do not coincide, we first derive
the tax rates on the polluting and on the non-polluting consumption good such that
5For 1/σ ≤ 2, the utility function and, thus, the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in the control and
state variables so that the necessary optimality conditions are also sufficient.
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the competitive economy replicates the social optimum. To do so, we denote by τd the
Pigou tax rate on the dirty consumption good and by τc the Pigou tax rate on the clean
good.6 The budget constraint of the household in the competitive economy, then, becomes
K˙ = AKβ− (pd+ τd)Cd− (pc+ τc)Cc− δK+Γ, with Γ lump-sum transfers or a lump-sum
tax that are adjusted such that the budget of the government is balanecd at each point
in time. Proposition 5 gives the Pigou tax rates.
Proposition 5 The competitive economy replicates the social optimum if the tax rates are
set such that τc = (−λ
s
2)ω2/λ1 and τd = (−λ
s
2)ω1/λ
s
1−χλ
s
3γ/λ
s
1 holds, with λ1(0) = λ
s
1(0).
Proof: See appendix D. 2
Proposition 5 demonstrates that the Pigou tax rate on the clean consumption good is
positive since the clean consumption good also contributes to environmental pollution. It
depends on the absolute value of the shadow price of pollution multiplied by the contri-
bution of one unit of clean consumption to pollution growth, relative to the shadow price
of physical capital. Only in case the clean consumption good does not lead to environ-
mental pollution, i.e. when ω2 = 0, the optimal tax rate equals zero. In that case clean
consumption does not go along with externalities so that there is no need to impose a tax
on that good.
The Pigou tax rate on the dirty consumption good also depends on the absolute value
of the shadow price of pollution multiplied by the contribution of one unit of dirty con-
sumption to pollution growth, relative to the shadow price of physical capital. However,
in contrast to the optimal tax rate on the clean consumption good, the Pigou tax on the
dirty consumption good is also a function of habits. The stronger the habit formation and
its shadow price are, the lower is the optimal tax rate on the dirty good. If habit formation
is very strong, the tax rate on the dirty consumption good may even be negative meaning
that the government pays a subsidy for the polluting good. In that case, the consumption
6We consider a quantity tax but an ad-valorem tax would would lead to the same result.
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of the dirty good in the competitive economy is too low compared to the social optimum.
This also implies that pollution at the steady-state in the competitive economy without
government intervention is lower than in the social optimum. The reason for that outcome
is to be seen in the second externality in this model, namely in habit formation that has
a positive effect on utility. Since that effect is not taken into account in the competitive
economy, the consumption of the dirty good in the social optimum can be higher than in
the competitive economy. This will occur when habit formation and its shadow value are
large.
If, on the other hand, the consumption of the dirty good in the competitive economy
is too high, the Pigou tax rate on the polluting good will be strictly positive. This is the
case when habit formation is not very strong so that the social planner does not attach a
high importance on that phenomenon but puts more emphasis on the negative externality
going along with consumption, i.e. on pollution control. More conceretly, this will always
hold when the cost of consuming one unit of the dirty good exceeds its external benefits
that consist in raising the stock of habits. In the case of no habit formation, we get the
usual result that the steady-state pollution in the competitive economy is higher than in
the social optimum. We summarize these results in the following proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Without habit formation, the steady-state pollution in the competitive
economy exceeds the steady-state pollution in the social optimum. With habit formation,
the steady-state pollution in the competitive economy falls short of the steady-state pollu-
tion in the social optimum if and only if (λs3)
⋆γ > (−λs2)
⋆ω1 holds.
Proof: See appendix E. 2
As concerns existence, uniqueness and stability of the steady-state, it is difficult to
make statements for the analytical model due to its complexity. However, for the model
without habit formation it is possible to show that the steady-state of the social optimum
is a saddle point. This is the contents of proposition 7.
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Proposition 7 In the social optimum without habit formation, the steady-state is saddle
point stable.
Proof: See appendix F. 2
To gain additional insight and in order to illustrate our analytical results, we resort to
the numerical example presented above. Table 2 presents the steady-state values for the
social optimum without and with habits.7 As in the competitive economy, the presence
of habits raises the ratio of clean to dirty consumption and, thus, reduces steady-state
pollution if the preferences are characetrized by distant complementarity. In the case
of adjacent complementarity, the revers holds. Then, habits reduce clean consumption
relative to the dirty one and lead to higher pollution.
No habits (χ = 0) With habits (χ = 1)
C⋆c /C
⋆
p P
⋆ C⋆c /C
⋆
p P
⋆ H⋆
1/σ = 1/2 1.084 0.650 1.207 0.621 0.554
1/σ = 4/3 1.419 0.577 0.859 0.714 0.658
Table 2: Steady-state values of the social optimum (K⋆ = 4.192).
Comparing the competitive economy with the social optimum when habit formation
is present, one realizes that in the case of distant complementarity the ratio of clean con-
sumption relative to the dirty one in the social optimum is smaller than in the competitive
economy leading to a higher steady-state pollution and to a higher stock of habits. The
reason for that outcome lies in the benefits of habit formation that exceed the costs of
pollution. The optimal steady-state tax rates for the economy in this case are τc = 0.021
and τd = −0.043 showing that the government in the competitive should subsidize the
7Again, there exists a unique saddle point stable steady-state with two and three negative real eigen-
values, respectively.
16
dirty consumtpion good. In the case of adjacent complementarity, the steady-state pollu-
tion and the stock of habits in the social optimum are lower compared to the competitive
economy and the ratio of clean to dirty consumption is higher. The Pigou tax rates at the
steady-state for this case are τc = 0.036 and τd = 0.049 showing that both goods should
be taxed in the competitive economy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the effects of habit formation on pollution for an otherwise
standard exogenous growth model, where the consumer can choose between a conventional
dirty good and a good that contributes less to pollution. Habits arise from the past
consumption of the polluting good and are defined as routines that result from unintended
learning processes and that simplify everday life.
The analysis of the competitive model economy has shown that the presence of habits
raises the consumption of the clean good relative to the dirty good if the preferences
are characterized by distant complementarity and reduces that ratio if there is adajacent
complementarity. Further, the effects of habits on the steady-state pollution stock depend
on whether distant or adjacent complementarity is given and on the contribution of the
goods to pollution as well as on their relative price. The Pigou tax rates have been
derived and it turned out that pollution in the social optimum can be higher than in the
competitive economy if habit formation is sufficiently strong so that the Pigou tax on the
dirty good is negative, i.e. the optimal policy is to subsidize the dirty consumption good.
This paper is a first approach to study the role of preferences with regard to consumer
behaviour and with regard to pollution. Hence, it could be extended in several directions.
For example, one could resort to a more general CES utility function where clean and
dirty consumption goods are not perfect substitutes. Further, the prices of the two types
of goods have been assumed to be constant parameters. Thus, it would be interesting to
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allow for learning effects in the production of the less polluting good, for example, that
reduce its price over time. Finally, it would also be interesting to analyze that model for
the case of ongoing growth that is generated endogenously.
A Proof of proposition 2
At the steady-state, we have pcC
⋆
c + pdC
⋆
d = A(K
⋆)β − δK⋆ = constant, with K⋆ =
(Aβ/(ρ + δ))1/(1−β) obtained from λ˙1 = 0. This gives C
⋆
d = (A(K
⋆)β − δK⋆ − pcC
⋆
c )/pd.
Thus, the pollution in steady-state is obtained from P˙ = 0 as
P ⋆ =
ω1(A(K
⋆)β − δK⋆)
ξpd
+
ω1pcC
⋆
c
ξpd
−
ω2C
⋆
c
ξ
giving
dP ⋆
dC⋆c
=
1
ξ
(
ω2 −
pcω1
pd
)
> (<) 0↔ ω2pd > (<) ω1pc
From K˙ = 0, one obtains for the model with habits (χ = 1)
λ⋆1 =
(
(1 +H)(1−σ)/σp
1−1/σ
d + p
1−1/σ
c
A(K⋆)β − δK⋆
)
−σ
and
dλ⋆1
dH
=
(1− σ)(λ⋆1)
σ−1(1 +H)(1/σ)−2p
1−1/σ
d
A(K⋆)β − δK⋆
> (<) 0↔ 1/σ > (<) 1
Since dCc/dλ1 < 0, this shows that dCc/dH > (<) 0 for 1/σ < (>) 1. Noting that for
1/σ < (>) 1 the preferences are characterized by distant (adjacent) complementarity, this
proves the proposition. 2
B Proof of proposition 3
Setting λ˙1 = 0 gives K
⋆ = (Aβ/(ρ + δ))1/(1−β). From K˙ = 0, one obtains for the model
without habits (χ = 0)
λ⋆1 =
(
A(K⋆)β − δK⋆
p
1−1/σ
d + p
1−1/σ
c
)
−σ
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Note that A(K⋆)β > δK⋆ holds because A(K⋆)β ≤ δK⋆ would imply δ ≥ (ρ+δ)/β, which
follows from K⋆ = (Aβ/(ρ + δ))1/(1−β). That, however, is excluded because of β ∈ (0, 1)
and ρ > 0.
Finally, P˙ = 0 leads to
P ⋆ = ξ−1
(
ω1
(λ⋆1pd)
1/σ
+
ω2
(λ⋆1pc)
1/σ
)
For χ = 0, the Jacobian matrix of (12)-(14) is given by
J =


ρ+ δ − AβKβ−1 −λ1Aβ(β − 1)K
β−2 0
σ−1λ
−1−1/σ
1 (p
1−1/σ
d + p
1−1/σ
c ) AβKβ−1 − δ 0
−σ−1λ
−1−1/σ
1
(
ω1
(λ⋆
1
pd)1/σ
+ ω1
(λ⋆
1
pc)1/σ
)
0 −ξ

 ,
with K and λ1 evaluated at the rest point {K
⋆, λ⋆1}.
One eigenvalue of that matrix is µ1 = −ξ. The other two are given by the eigenvalues
of
Jp =

 ρ+ δ − AβKβ−1 −λ1Aβ(β − 1)Kβ−2
σ−1λ
−1−1/σ
1 (p
1−1/σ
d + p
1−1/σ
c ) AβKβ−1 − δ


Using that ρ + δ − AβKβ−1 = 0 holds at the steady-state, the determinant of Jp can be
computed as
det Jp = λ1Aβ(β − 1)K
β−2σ−1λ
−1−1/σ
1 (p
1−1/σ
d + p
1−1/σ
c ) < 0
Hence, one eigenvalue of Jp is negative and one is positive so that J has two negative
eigenvalues and one positive yielding saddle point stability. 2
C Proof of proposition 4
Setting λ˙1 = 0 again yields K
⋆ = (Aβ/(ρ + δ))1/(1−β). Solving H˙ = 0 gives λ⋆1 =
p−1d (γH(1 +H)
1−1/σ)−σ. Inserting K⋆ and λ⋆1 in K˙ leads to
K˙ = A(K⋆)β − δK⋆ −H − pc
(
pd
pc
)1/σ
H(1 +H)1−1/σ
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The derivative of K˙ is
∂K˙
∂H
= −1− pc
(
pd
pc
)1/σ
(1 +H)−1/σ(1 + 2H −H/σ)
Thus, the function K˙ starts at a positive value for H = 0, is monotonically declining in
H, for 1/σ ≤ 2, and converges to −∞ for H → ∞. Consequently, there exists a unique
positive finite H⋆ that solves K˙ = 0. Finally, solving P˙ = 0 one obtains
P ⋆ = (ω1/ξ)
(
(1 +H⋆)1−σ
λ⋆1pd
)1/σ
+ (ω2/ξ) (λ
⋆
1pc)
−1/σ
For χ = 1, the Jacobian matrix of (12)-(15) is given by
J1 =


−AβKβ−1 + δ + ρ −A(β − 1)βKβ−2λ1 0 0
pc2(λ1pc)
−1−
1
σ
σ
+ (H+1)
1
σ−1pd
2(λ1pd)
−1−
1
σ
σ
AβKβ−1 − δ 0 −C1
−pcω2(λ1pc)
−1−
1
σ
σ
− (H+1)
1
σ−1pd(λ1pd)
−1−
1
σ ω1
σ
0 −ξ ω1C1
−γ(H+1)
1
σ−1pd(λ1pd)
−1−
1
σ
σ
0 0 γ(C1 − 1)


,
with C1 = (H + 1)
(1/σ)−2pd(λ1pd)
−1/σ ((1/σ)− 1) and K, λ1, P and H evaluated at the
rest point {K⋆, λ⋆1, P
⋆, H⋆}.
One eigenvalue of that matrix is µ1 = −ξ. The other three eigenvalues are the eigen-
values of
Jp1 =


AβKβ−1 − δ −C1
pc2(λ1pc
σ
+ (H+1)
1
σ−1pd
2(λ1pd)
−1−
1
σ
σ
0 γ(C1 − 1) −
γ(H+1)
1
σ−1pd(λ1pd)
−1−
1
σ
σ
−A(β − 1)βKβ−2λ1 0 −AβK
β−1 + δ + ρ


Using that ρ + δ − AβKβ−1 = 0 holds at the steady-state, the determinant of Jp1 can be
computed as
det Jp1 =
A(1− β)βKβ−2(λ1pc)
−1/σ(λ1pd)
−1/σ
(
γpc(σ − 1)(H + 1)
1
σ
)
(H + 1)2σ2
+
A(1− β)βKβ−2
(
γ
(
pd(H + 1)
1
σ (λ1pc)
1
σ + (H + 1)pc(λ1pd)
1
σ
))
(λ1pc)1/σ(λ1pd)1/σ(H + 1)σ
,
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so that 1/σ ≤ 1 is sufficient but not necessary for det Jp1 > 0. Next, we define
W1 = a11a22 − a12a21 + a22a33 − a23a32 + a11a33 − a13a31,
with aij the element of the i-th row and j-th column of the matrix J
p
1. In our case, we get
W1 = (AβK
β−1 − δ)γ(C1 − 1)− Aβ(1− β)K
β−2λc1a13
From ρ + δ − AβKβ−1 = 0 we know that AβKβ−1 − δ > 0 holds. Recalling that C1 =
(H+1)(1/σ)−2pd(λ1pd)
−1/σ ((1/σ)− 1) and using a13 > 0 shows that 1/σ ≤ 1 is a sufficient
but not necessary condition for W1 < 0. Since det J
p
1 > 0 and W1 < 0 are sufficient for
two negative and and one positive eigenvalue of Jp1 (see Wirl, 1997), this demonstrates
that 1/σ ≤ 1 is a sufficient but not necessary condition for J1 to have one positive and
three negative eigenvalues. 2
D Proof of proposition 5
We equate (9) with (19) to obtain the optimal tax rate on the dirty good and (10) with
(20) to obtain the optimal tax rate on the clean consumption good, with pd+ τd the price
of the dirty good in the competitive economy and pc+τc the price of the clean good in the
competitive economy. Further, setting the initial shadow prices of physical capital to the
same value, i.e. λ1(0) = λ
s
1(0), assures that the shadow price of capital in the competitive
economy is equal to that in the social optimum for all t ∈ [0,∞). 2
E Proof of proposition 6
To prove that proposition, we note that in the economy without habit formation the
relative steady-state consumption is given by Crel = pc/pd for the competitive economy.
In the social optimum it is given by
Csrel =
pc − ω2λ
s
2/λ
s
1
pd − ω1λs2/λ
s
1
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Thus, steady-state consumption of the clean good relative to the dirty good in the compet-
itive economy is always lower than in the social optimum because of ω2 < ω1 and λ2 < 0.
Since total consumption is fix at the steady-state, this implies that dirty consumption is
higher and clean consumption is lower so that the steady-state stock of pollution in the
competitive economy is larger.
With habit formation, the tax rate on the dirty good is negative if the condition
in the proposition holds. A negative tax implies that consumption of the dirty good
in the competitive economy without government intervention is lower than in the social
optimum. Together with a fixed total steady-state consumption this implies that the
steady-state pollution in the competitive economy is lower than in the social optimum. 2
F Proof of proposition 7
To prove that proposition we note that the dynamics of the social optimum without habit
formation is described by the equations (5), (6), (21) and (22). The Jacobian for that
dynamic system is
J2 =


AβKβ−1 − δ 0 pc
2C−1c
σ
+
pd
2C−1d
σ
−pcω2C
−1
c
σ
−
pdω1C
−1
d
σ
0 −ξ −pcω2C
−1
c
σ
−
pdω1C
−1
d
σ
ω22C
−1
c
σ
+
ω12C
−1
d
σ
−A(β − 1)βλ1K
β−2 0 −AβKβ−1 + δ + ρ 0
0 1 0 ρ+ ξ


,
with Cc = (λ1pc − λ2ω2)
−1/σ and Cd = (λ1pd − λ2ω1)
−1/σ. Using ρ+ δ = AβKβ−1 at the
steady-state that follows from λ˙1 = 0, the determinant can be computed as
det J2 = A(1− β)βλ1K
β−2
(
ξ(ρ+ ξ)
(
pc
2C−1c + pd
2C−1d
)
σ
+
(pcω1 − pdω2)
2C−1c C
−1
d
σ2
)
> 0
Next, we define W2 as
W2 = a11a33 − a13a31 + a22a44 − a24a42 + 2(a12a34 − a14a32)
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For our model, W2 is computed as
W2 = A(β − 1)βλ1K
β−2
(
p2c
Ccσ
+
p2d
Cdσ
)
− ξ(ρ+ ξ)−
ω2
2
Ccσ
−
ω1
2
Cdσ
< 0
According to lemma 2 in Dockner and Feichtinger (1991), a positive determinant and a
negative W2 implies two negative real eigenvalues or two complex conjugate eigenvalues
with negative real parts. This proves the proposition. 2
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